Siachen - Myths and Facts

On April 7, 2012, tragedy struck the 6 Northern Light Infantry's (6NLI) battalion headquarters camp at Giyari outpost at the snout of the Giyari glacier (which rises near the Bilafond La pass) situated at an altitude of 4000 metres on the western slopes of the Saltoro Range in the Gilgit-Baltistan province of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) killing 126 soldiers and 14 civilians by burying them under a massive 80 feet of snow over a spread of 1 Sq. Km.  Just three bodies have been recovered after almost eight weeks of search and recovery operations with 450 rescuers on the job and with Gen. Kiyani mostly stationing himself there to oversee the operations personally. It was finally on May 29 that these 140 persons were declared dead as 'martyrs' (shuhada) by the Government of Pakistan. The Pakistani Army Spokesman Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas said in a briefing that over 3000 Pakistani soldiers have died in these desolate heights ever since c. 1984 when the Indian and Pakistani troops started confronting each other on these icy, dangerous and very high altitude mountain ridges and escarpments. During the same period, India has lost 950 soldiers according to Indian Defence Minister A.K.Antony in the Indian Parliament on May 1, 2012. Arguably, this is the highest battlefield in the world. In September, 2003 Pakistan proposed an informal ceasefire which has held since the. Since that time, India has significantly brought down its fatality rate. With better communication, better medical facilities, mobile hyperbaric chambers, better clothing, special equipment, quicker medevac and better transportation etc. India has reached a near-zero casualty rate. Of course while crevasses and avalanches lurk dangerously for the foot-soldiers, heavy downdraft winds and whiteouts  are another matter for the helicopter pilots. Since c. 2006, the Indian Army has opened up the Siachen for a 22-day trekking tourism and adventure too.

Ten days after the Giyari tragedy, the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) of the Pakistani Army (PA), Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani spoke of demilitarization of Siachen. He spoke of the high cost and environmental impact as the reasons for such a demilitarization. He added, "Peaceful coexistence between the two neighbours is very important so that everybody can concentrate on the well-being of the people". Those words, coming from an ex-ISI chief who planned the 26/11/2008 Mumbai urban terror carnage, sound hollow. It is generally believed that India spends almost Rs. 50 million (5 Crores) a day to maintain its troops in this area while Pakistan is claimed to spend one-third of that daily. The Indian logistical support is through the costly aerial route for the extensive Indian deployment at higher altitudes while Pakistan, having the advantages of being located at fewer places, at lower heights and near inhabited places has a logistical advantage. So, why is Gen. Kayani suddenly awakening to the economics of the Siachen conflict ? That is because, they have lost a very important supply base at Giyari. Gen. Kayani wants to pre-empt any Indian military move to take advantage of the precarious Pakistani situation of having not only lost an important logistics base but also well-trained, experienced and hardened troops who could not be easily replaced in such large numbers quickly. The highest helipad in the world, Sonam (20997 ft), is maintained by India here. So, 'concentrating on the well-being of the people' rather than on this wasteful expenditure is no doubt a common-sense argument that one can immediately agree with. The Indian Minister of State (MoS) for Defence, Pallam Raju, welcomed Gen. Kayani's statement immediately. On April 30, Indian Defence Minister, A.K.Antony said, "12th round of Defence Secretary- level talks were held between India and Pakistan on May 30-31, 2011. It was agreed to continue the discussions in a meaningful and result-oriented manner", in a written reply. After visiting the area of tragedy, the former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, went to the extent of saying that Pakistan must unilaterally withdraw its troops first and he felt that soon thereafter India would follow suit. Many analysts of Pakistan refer to Indian 'aggression' of Siachen, and they use the latest tragedy as an opportunity to propagate wrong history as usual. Newspapers in Pakistan and even many in India referred to the tragedy at Saltoro as a tragedy in Siachen itself and there were calls to withdraw troops from that region. Not that such tragedies are unlikely to occur (or have not occured)  in Siachen proper, but a lack of knowledge of the topography of the region leads to this entire area being referred to as Siachen. Similarly, a lack of knowledge of events leading up to Operation Meghdoot that led to Indian troops occupying the Siachen and Saltoro heights in the first place is responsible for usage of terms such as 'aggression by India'. India and Pakistan have had 12 rounds of unsuccessful dialogue on this issue and the thirteenth is scheduled in Islamabad on June 11 & 12. It is therefore a good time to understand the issues involved.

So, what is the story of Siachen ?

An overview of the geography and topography of the region is in order before we look at geopolitical, military and strategic issues of this conflict.

            Courtesy: The United Nations   (Open in a new tab to see full size)

There are five significant mountain ranges in the J&K state and these are, from east to west, the Karakoram Range (400 miles long), the Ladakh Range, the Zanskar Range, the Great Himalayan Range and the Pir Panjal Range. Of course, there are numerous other minor mountain ranges that branch off these significant five, such as Deosai Mountains, Saltoro,  and Baltoro to name a few. The Karakoram (meaning Black Gravel in Kyrgyz language) Range ends at the Pamir Knot in Central Asia. The sub-ranges of the main Karakoram Range are referred to as muztagh. Thus, for example, we have Siachen Muztagh, Rimo Muztagh and the Sasser Muztagh in the Eastern Karakoram lying to the east and south of the Siachen glacier. The Siachen Muztagh had been explored by the IA during the 1978 to 1981 period (see later for more information). Though these areas have been explored since early 1820s, serious exploration started only in the second half of the nineteenth century as the contours of the Great Game began to take shape. One of the pioneering explorers in the late nineteenth century was Maj. Francis Younghusband who led a British India army unit to capture Lhasa. While the Siachen had been earlier explored by various European expeditions, they all came over the Bilafond La pass in the west. The IA expedition of c. 1978 was the first to ascend it from the Nubra valley through the snout of the glacier. The Indian Army Engineers expedition climbed Rimo IV in 1984. By c. 1985, the IA had almost thoroughly explored the Rimo Muztagh. The Sasser Kangri in the Sasser Muztagh, which is south-east of Siachen, had been first climbed by the IA in 1973 itself.

For full size picture, click here.

It is also instructive to know some other salient geographical features. The Kashmir valley itself lies between the Great Himalayan Range and the PirPanjal Range. The Zoji La pass on the Great Himalayan Range gives an access from the Kashmir valley to Leh in Ladakh through Drass and Kargil. The Chorbat La pass on the Ladakh Range and on the CFL (now, the LoC skirts further north of the Chorbat La after the 1971 war) gives another access to the Shyok Valley to Piun and then to Skardu through Khapalu (the last two in POK. Khapalu is the Brigade HQ for PA's Siachen operations). The 75-Km long and, 1000 feet deep, on an average, 4.5 Km wide (between 2 Kms & 8 Kms at different points) Siachen (meaning, "a place of roses' in Balti) Glacier, the second largest outside of the two polar regions, is situated on the eastern Karakoram Range, buffeted between the Saltoro Range in the South and West and the main Karakoram to the East. The glacier runs diagonally from southeast to northwest.  The Saltoro Range, whose northernmost tip is Sia Kangri (7422m) at less than 5 Kms north of Indira Col (which incidentally is the northernmost point of India today), is nearly 85 Kms long and lies 15 to 20 Kms to the west of the Siachen Glacier. A few kilometres to the east of the easternmost tip of this glaciated region is the strategically important and all-weather Karakoram Pass (5540m) which has been part of the centuries-old Silk Road to Yarkand and beyond. It is near the Karakoram Pass that the world's highest airfield, Daulat Beg Oldie, is located on the Indian side. Karakoram Pass can be reached from Nubra Valley through Sasser Pass and Daulat Beg Oldie.

A few kilometres to the east of the Karakoram Pass begins the Aksai Chin area that China illegally occupied from India in c. 1962. Up North of the Siachen Glacier is the Baltoro Glacier right under the second highest mountain peak in the world, known as K2 or Mount Godwin-Austin. This is close to the ~6000 Sq. Km. Shaksgam Valley (China & Pakistan refer to this area as Trans Karakoram Tract to fudge the historic significance of this area to the state of Jammu & Kashmir)  that Pakistan ceded to China in c. 1963 to enable it to construct the Karakoram Highway  from Kashgar to Pakistan. The Turkestan La pass from Siachen open into the Shaksgam Valley. Earlier, China had also constructed its  National Highway No. 219 whose construction started in c. 1951 as soon as Communist China forcibly established its suzerainty over Tibet . This Highway connected Tibet and Sinkiang (now Xinjiang) surreptitiously through India's Aksai Chin (a length of 230 Kms). In a note to Government of India, the Chinese said, "The Aksai Chin area has always been China's territory; it is the communication artery linking Sinkiang and the Ari District in Tibet of China and has always been under the jurisdiction of the Chinese Government; both in law and fact there is no room for dispute about China's sovereignty over this area." In fact, Pakistan's cartographic aggression and authorizing of foreign mountaineering expeditions was a similar fait-accompli that India wanted not to repeat when it decided to take action. India's fears were confirmed when intelligence (and even a note from a Pakistani Brigadier to his Indian counterpart) also confirmed it.

Further north of the Baltoro is the Rakaposhi Range and then the famous Khunjerab Pass through which the Karakoram Highway reaches Pakistan from China. For these reasons, Siachen is also refrred to as the tri-junction of India, China and Pakistan. The northern-most point of the Siachen Glacier is the Indira Col (or Indira Pass which is named after the Indian Goddess Lakshmi by one of the earliest explorers, the Workman couple in c. 1911 and has nothing to do with Mrs. Indira Gandhi). On the eastern side of the Siachen Glacier are other peaks of the Karakoram (in a west-to-east direction) such as Singhi Kangri (7202m, 'kangri' meaning peak in Balti language), Teram Kangri (7407m), and the Apsarasas Kangri (7236m), The famous Nubra river, among others, originates in the Siachen Glacier at the snout of the glacier near a place called Dzingrulma (where the road to Siachen ends and where India's base camp is located) and joins the Shyok River which itself then drains into the Indus near Skardu in the Baltistan region of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). The Shyok itself originates from the Rimo Glacier that is connected to the Siachen Glacier through the Teram-Shehr glacier. On the road from Leh to the Nubra Valley is located the Khardung La (Ladakh Range)  pass at 18400 ft. and claimed to be the second highest motorable road in the world. Further to the east of Khardung La is the Chorbat La pass which gives an easier access to the northern Shyok Valley and further to Skardu. Overall, this region is reputed to have over 150 glaciers and is also sometimes referred to as the third pole.

On the Saltoro Range, the highest peak is the Saltoro Kangri. The Saltoro Range itself has five passes, Sia La (northernmost and at 5700m), Bilafond La (also known as the Saltoro Pass at 5547m), Gyong La (at 5500m), Yarma La(at 6100m) and Chulung La (at 5800m). The 110 Km. long AGPL would then start from near Indira Col and then go along the ridge covering peaks and passes southwards in the following order: Conway Saddle, Sia La, Silver Throne (the Baltoro Kangri in POK is known as Golden Throne), Mt. Ghent(7401m), Saltoro Kangri, Bilafond La, Gyong La, Yarma La and Chulung La to Point NJ9842. All the peaks and passes are held by the IA. The backstabbing drama by the PA at Gyong La is all the more a reason why the IA cannot withdraw from Siachen. (See this)

Genesis of the issue

Siachen cannot be looked at in isolation or as a conflict between India and Pakistan alone. India's strategic decisions must be taken in the context also of the boundary dispute between India and China and the developing nexus (since at least c. 1962) between Pakistan and China in the Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) area.

After the 1947-48 war ended due to India taking the issue to the United Nations, the Army commanders of both sides met in Karachi in 1949 to delineate the Ceasrfire Line (CFL). They could precisely delineate the CFL only upto a certain map-grid point, known as Khor or NJ980420. This is a point approximately mid-way between the Nubra and the Shyok rivers between the Ladakh and the Saltoro Ranges and at the southern end of the Saltoro range. The military commanders agreed that the CFL would run "thence north to the glaciers". The Annexure 26 of the UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) Report dated July 29, 1949, available here, states the following in Paragraph (B)(2)(d) in Part II titled 'Agreement': From Dalunang eastwards the cease-fire line will follow the general line point 15495, Ishman, Manus, Gangam, Gunderman, Point 13620, Funkar (Point 17628), Marmak, Natsara, Shangruti (Point 1,531), Chorbat La (Point 16700), Chalunka (on the Shyok River), Khor, thence north to the glaciers. This portion of the cease- fire line shall be demarcated in detail on the basis of the factual position as of 27 July, 1949, by the local commanders assisted by United Nations military observers.

It is interesting to note that the Karachi agreement cited above was signed by Lt. Gen Shrinagesh while it was signed by Maj. Gen. J. Cawthorn on behalf of the Pakistani Government. Maj. Gen. J. Cawthorn, a British Army officer of Australian descent, was responsible for effectively setting up the notorious ISID (though he was only its second Director General). He articulated Pakistani positions as to why the state of J&K must be merged with Pakistan in various fora. It is also interesting to note that another prominent member of the Indian team at Karachi drafting this document was Brig. S.H.F.J. Manekshaw (later Field Marshal) who played a very key role in the accession of and later military operations in J&K during 1947-1948.

From even a cursory glance of the maps, one can see that this would then encompass the Siachen Glaciers. During the 1962 India-China war, the US Department of Defense (DoD) offered the services of the USAF pilots to ferry Indian troops to and from the Aksai Chin area, an area that needed overflying the Siachen Glaciers. A few years later, in c. 1967, the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) of the DoD produced maps known as Tactical Pilotage Charts (TPCs) that indicated the CFL running from Point NJ980420 to the Karakoram Pass (KKP) which is to the east of the Siachen Glaciers. After the 1971 Bangladesh War, the CFL nomenclature had been changed to LoC (Line of Control) as per the Shimla Agreement of 1972 between India and Pakistan. Yet, the LoC remained undemarcated after Point NJ9842. Pakistan began to interpret the term, "thence north to the glaciers" as "thence North East to the Karakoram Pass" while India correctly interpreted that as "thence north (along internationally accepted practice of ridgelines and watersheds forming boundaries between territories) to Indira Col". In the case of river boundaries too, the mid-channel marker (known as thalweg or the deepest water in a stream) is the principle for demarcation. In the Sir-creek issue too, Pakistan is demanding the eastern bank (the Indian side) to be used as the boundary rather than the mid-channel. International boundaries between adjacent countries are not drawn as straight lines when ridges, rivers and watersheds constitute the borderlands. Air Commodore Jasjit Singh has argued that any compromise on the watershed principle could adversely affect India in the resolution of the India-China border issue.

The adjustment of borders between Pakistan and China at this crucial tri-junction has to be also taken into account. Since the border had not been demarcated between British India and China in this area, Pakistan also had a border dispute with the communist China after its independence. Pakistan had made  no progress at all with the Chinese in the border talks up until December 1962, by which time the India-China war had concluded with China having decisively dealt a blow to Indian military. The talks which started in Beijing in May, 1962 had stalled immediately because neither side had any legal records to claim their border alignment. Later, when the talks resumed in Pakistan this time on October 12, 1962, Ayub Khan records in his book, Friends not Masters, how the Chinese were ‘very difficult’ by claiming several areas on the Pakistan side including the Khunjerab Valley and the K-2 mountain peak. The Indo-China War was still more than a week away, October 20, 1962. After the India-China war ended abruptly on November 20, 1962, the Pakistanis were able to immediately find an innovative solution to their vexatious border problem with the Chinese based on the principle of using the watershed of the Indus basin rivers and the traditional grazing grounds used by the Hunza shepherds. Thus, Pakistan conceded vast portions to China, including the Shaksgam Valley. The Official Pakistan Map of 1962 in this area included 11000 Sq. Miles of territory (to the north of the ‘Traditional Frontier’)which has been totally lost by Pakistan to China. Pakistan never staked its claim to these areas in c. 1962, choosing rather to go by the 'Traditional Frontier' several hundred Kms. to the South of the Official Frontier. This is the area bordering Xinjiang (Sinkiang) where the British had built a road all the way from Gilgit in Hunza to Kashgar in Sinkiang where they had a Consulate. In addition, Pakistan conceded another about 3200 Sq. Miles to the south of the ‘Traditional Frontier’ to arrive at the new boundary alignment (out of the 3700 Sq. Miles claimed by China, it was ‘gracious’ enough to give 500 Sq. Miles of cattle grazing ground to Pakistan).

By c. 1978, the IA had setup some camps in the Siachen Glacier itself. In fact, the first landing of a rotary wing aircraft took place on October 6, 1978 in what then was Advance Base Camp II for a casualty evacuation. It was a Chetak that landed at a height of 15,500 ft. to support the exploratory expedition of Col. Narender 'Bull' Kumar after whom the Siachen base camp has been named by the IA. The camp exists at the same place where the c. 1981 Army expedition team led by Col. Narender 'Bull' Kumar set up their Advanced Base Camp at the confluence of the K12 and Siachen glaciers. It is from here that his expedition climbed the Bilafond La pass, Indira Col, Turkestan La, Sia Kangri, Sia La, and the Saltoro Kangri and mapped them precisely for future use. (See this)

It was on April 13, 1984, almost 28 years to the day before the latest Gyari avalanche disaster, that India launched Operation Meghdoot in an audacious and daring operation very reminiscent of  Operation Duck to rid the 3500m. high Zoji La pass of the Pakistani intruders and save Ladakh from falling into Pakistani hands in c. 1948. In c. 1983, India has intelligence information that Pakistan had assembled a special group, the Burzil Force, to capture Saltoro and Siachen beyond that. In fact, a protest note from the Pakistani FCNA (Force Commander Northern Area) to his Indian counterpart on August 16, 1983 had claimed that Indian territory extended in this sector only up to the Karakoram Pass. This followed the citing of some troops of Indian Army's Ladakh Scouts on the glacier by the SSG troops of the PA. Based on this protest note and the intelligence, the IA came to the conclusion that the only way to thwart this aggression would be to occupy the heights and the passes on the Saltoro and thus was Op. Meghdoot planned. We now know from the accounts of Lt. Gen. Jahan Dad Khan, the then Corps Commander of the Rawalpindi-based X Corps of the PA (through his book, 'Pakistan Leadership Challenges', Oxford University Press, 08 July 1999) which was responsible for Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA) responsible for this sector, that the PA was preparing to seize Saltoro and Siachen in 1984 and the operation had been cleared at the highest levels. By c. 1983, Pakistan had access to nuclear weapons, thanks to Chinese proliferation, and they were emboldened to launch this adventure in Saltoro. Pakistan's use of terrorism against India under a nuclear overhang, in the Indian Punjab, the state of J&K and later all over India and even Indian interests abroad bear out the truth that Pakistan's proposed military action in c. 1984 in the Saltoro/Siachen area was indeed on the back of newly acquired nuclear weapons.

The last major PA assault on Indian positions on the Saltoro ridge happened way back in c. 1992. It was, like all previous assaults, unsuccessful. It was in April 1987 that the SSG Commandos of the PA occupied a position overlooking the Bilafond La pass. This poistion was called the 'Quaid Post' by the PA. On June 25, 1987, the IA overran the Quaid Post and evicted the PA, an operation in which Bana Singh was given the highest award of Param Vir Chakra (PVC).  In September, 1987, a certain Brig. Musharraf of the SSG attempted to capture certain salients in Bilafond La. It was a terrible disaster when a few hundred Pakistani soldiers died and a very hurt Musharraf decided to avenge it in c. 1999 when he launched an even more disastrous Kargil operation. In March 1989, Pakistan made another attempt through the Chumik glacier (near the now extinct Giyari base) but even that could not succeed. However, the Indian and Pakistani army commanders came to an understanding after this incident that neither side would occupy the difficult heights of the Chumik and this has been respected ever since. In November, 1992, the FCNA Maj. Gen. Zahir-ul-Islam Abbassi authorized another operation. This atempt led to the death of dozens of PA soldiers, as a result of which, Maj. Gen. Abbassi was stripped of his post by the then COAS, Gen. Asif Nawaz Janjua. As an aside, Gen, Abbassi later tried in September 1995 to stage a military coup with the help of the noted terrorist Qari Saifullah Akhtar of Harkat-ul-Jihadi-Islami (HuJI). After serving a minimum sentence, he was released in c. 1999 by Gen. Musharraf when he usurped power from Nawaz Sharif. Abbassi then joined Sipah-e-Sahab Pakistan (SSP) to work tirelessly for establishing a Caliphate.

When he launched the Kargil operation, Gen. Musharraf would have known that the major powers would intervene rapidly in a war launched with India, an idea that he welcomed as an opportunity to further internationalize the Kashmir issue. At the same time, the idea of Gen. Musharraf was to re-capture the areas lost during the 1971 war (such as Thang, Pachthang, Thyakshi, Chalunka and Turtok along the Shyok river), cut-off Leh from Kashmir and create a logistics vacuum for the Siachen -based IA brigade before the intervention of major powers resulted in a ceasefire. Gen. V.P.Malik, the then Chief of Army Staff (COAS) of the Indian Army during the Kargil War says in an interview "I feel the failed Siachen operations hurt Musharraf  more than they did anyone else, as well as other actions involving him that failed." as the reasons that prompted the Kargil misadventure. Evidence such as the then Pakistan Foregin Minister Sartaj Aziz's statement in London in early July, 1999  linking Pakistani troop withdrawal from Kargil to IA's withdrawal from Siachen and Saltoro confirms Gen. V.P.Malik's assessment. A PAF Officer, Kaiser Tufail, who was part of the planning, has this to say about the Kargil operation:

The target was a vulnerable section of the Dras-Kargil Road, whose blocking would virtually cut off the crucial life-line which carried the bulk of supplies needed for daily consumption as well as annual winterstocking in the Leh-Siachen sector. He [Lt. Gen. Mahmud Ahmed, GOC, X Corps and later to become the Chief of the ISI until he was relieved of his post for being a double-agent of the Afghan Taliban & Al-Qaeda. He has many other credits as well. He allowed Ahmed Al-Khadir, who bombed the Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad in November, 1995 to escape from a safe house with the help of the Taliban  in Peshawar; wire-transferred USD 100,000 to the WTC terrorist Mohammed Atta  through terrorist  Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh; he was tasked by the US to talk to the Taliban to hand-over Osama bin Laden but instead, he asked them to resist the US; he was a part of the 'Gang of Four' who brought Gen. Musharraf to power ousting Nawaz Sharif ] was very hopeful that this stratagem could choke off the Indians in the vital sector for up to a month, after which the monsoons would prevent vehicular movement (due to landslides) and, also suspend all airlift by the IAF. “Come October, we shall walk in to Siachen – to mop up the dead bodies of hundreds of Indians left hungry, out in the cold,” he succinctly summed up what appeared to be a new dimension to the Siachen dispute.

Circumstantial evidence such as the eleven attempts made by the PA to capture ridgelines and salients in the Saltoro Range in c. 1998 also add to the evidence. Accompanying his Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif for talks with the British Prime Minister Tony Blair on the Kargil situation, he said, "Pakistan has agreed to request and appeal to the freedom fighters to withdraw from Kargil if India also agrees to vacate the areas that it occupied on the LoC after the signing of the Simla Agreement."

India uses helicopters such as the Cheetah,  ALH Dhruv Mark IIIs or even the much bigger MI-17 VIs (which can now fly upto 18000 ft.) for logistics from the base camp to the various posts dotting the Siachen and the Saltoro. The supply line starts from Chandigarh to the Thoise airbase ('Thoise' is an acronym that stands for Transit Holding Of Indian Soldiers Establishment)  in the Shyok Valley. Thoise falls under the Partapur sector of the Indian Army. The supply line employs the giant IL-76s, AN-32s, MI-17s, the Dhruvs and the ubiquitous Cheetahs at different stages.

Why does the Indian Army distrust the PA ? In December 1948, India vacated the pickets on the important Haji Pir Pass that connects Punch and Uri. The PA promptly occupied them even as the Cease Fire went into effect from Jan 1, 1949. It was with great difficulty and a lot of sacrifices that the IA re-took the Haji Pir Pass in the 1965 war but in the talks in Tashkent, India returned it to Pakistan. In Kargil and other areas which are clearly delineated and agreed to by both the parties after the 1971 war, the IA has been withdrawing pickets during the winter since c. 1982 and in c. 1998, the PA surreptitiously occupied all the vacated heights prompting a bloody war.  Even galciated salients in the Kargil sector which IA commanders assumed that the PA would not occupy were found to have been occupied. Now, China says that in order to celebrate the 'long-term friendship with Pakistan', they will be sending an expedition to the Boltoro glacier in June/July timeframe.  It is therefore inconceivable for the IA to vacate the Saltoro and Siachen posts, especially when China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) has begun to be present in large numbers in Balawaristan after c. 2008, hoping that the invidious and perfidious PA would somehow abide by any agreement that may be arrived at authenticating the ground position. This is especially important considering the fact that in the negotiations in c. 2011, the Pakistani Defence Ministry representatives pushed India to include Chinese representatives in the discussion because China was controlling the nearby Shaksgam Valley.

What do the protagonists of de-militarization say ?

• “low-hanging fruit” of the India-Pakistan peace process
  
  Certainly, Siachen cannot be the 'low-hanging fruit' to be plucked first before attempting to resolve the weightier issues. With border delineation between India and China not yet resolved after sixty years of negotiations (and a war), with Pakistan ceding an important area of Kashmir (the Shaksgam Valley abutting the Siachen glacier in the north) illegally to China, with increasing presence of the Chinese PLA troops in the sensitive Gilgit-Baltistan area, with the expressed desire of the PLA to come to the Baltoro glacier abutting the northern Siachen on the west, with Pakistan claiming the Indian border to end at the Karakoram pass citing the 1963 Pakistan-China agreement thus establishing clearly a collusion between these two nations in map and border making at the cost of India, and with the knowledge of the Pakistani propensity to be fraudulent and completely untrustworthy, the Siachen cannot be a 'low-hanging fruit' at least from an Indian perspective. After all, the entire state of Jammu & Kashmir as it existed on October 26, 1947 belongs to India. Then, why should India negotiate separately for Siachen alone ?
•  Occupation of Siachen contributes to global warming
  
  It may or may not be. I do not know this for a fact one way or another. The biggest contributors to global warming are the Western powers, especially the USA, which also seems to be at the forefront of blunting Indian military advantage in Saltoro. It has been the US which in the last sixty years of its reckless support for a state like Pakistan, has brought the whole world to the brink of disaster. The Siachen impact on ecology, even if it were to be true, pales into insignificance in comparison to Pakistan's jihadi terrorism and nuclear proliferation and the US' support for these two activities since at least the 1970s. 
• It is possible to de-militarize Siachen/Saltoro in a fool-proof manner using technology. (See this)
  
  As noted elsewhere in this blog, there is no fail-safe and fool-proof technology available to monitor troop movements in these areas. Those who occupy the peaks, salients, passes will dictate terms. India enjoys an enormous advantage here, thanks to the sacrifices of thousands of its brave soldiers over nearly 30 years and the brilliant mountaineering expeditions of a group of dedicated army officers and rank & file in the 70s and the 80s.
• The Siachen conflict is a cruel, costly and unnecessary war that must be brought to an end.
  
  This is the most humbug statement I have come across. Every war is cruel, costly and unnecessary from one viewpoint or another. How is the Kashmir War (in its various manifestations since 1947) less costly or less cruel or more justified ? How is Partition of India
  not cruel, costly or justified ?

What do the Pakistanis say ?

•  Pakistan cannot authenticate any AGPL because it was India that aggressed and should not have been where it is now.
     
  This is a hollow argument for two reasons. One, Pakistan and its Cold-war ally, the USA, had already committed cartographic aggression by depicting in the maps that the Siachen area belonged to Pakistan. Further, Pakistan had made all preparations to mount a military assault on Saltoro and Siachen in c. 1984. India got wind of the impending action and simply pre-empted them by a few days. The local Pakistani commander was waiting for a warmer weather according to Shuja Nawaz, the brother of ex-Pakistani COAS, Gen. Asif Nawaz Janjua, in his book, 'Crossed Swords'. As already noted, the Rawalpindi Corps Commander of c. 1983, Lt. Gen. Jahan Dad Khan has written how an operation similar to Op. Meghdoot had been planned by the PA for May 1984. The IA simply staved off Pakistani aggression on Indian territory and cannot therefore be equated to aggression.

Pakistanis also refer to India unilaterally altering the LoC in Siachen, thus violating the Simla Agreement. Pakistan cannot put on this face of 'injured innocence' in light of its designs on this area since long, first by trying to create a fait-accompli by 'authorizing' mountaineering expeditions from Europe, Japan and Australia, later by altering maps, then by trying to send its army patrols in this area and finally planning to capture it through force in May 1984.


• There is no reference to "thence north to the glaciers" in the 1972 Shimla Agreement.
  
  There is some confusion by the ambiguous set of words. It says "From there, the line of control runs northeastwards to Thang (inclusive to India) thence eastwards joining the glaciers" (See this)
  
  Though the wordings appear to be unfortunate, we will shortly see why the seeming contradiction is not really one.
  
  Even the 1965 Tashkent Agreement does not refer to "thence north to the glaciers" because the troops were agreed to be withdrawn to the CFL determined by the 1949 CFL. It therefore firmly recognized the agreement reached in Karachi in 1949. However, after the 1971 war on the western front, the two sides decided to retain whatever areas they captured. This resulted finally in the CFL being re-designated as LoC and a new alignment to the east of NJ9842. The Simla Agreement refers to the new Indian Position of Thang from where the LoC does run eastwards to NJ9842. This was what the Shimla Agreement meant when it said 'eastwards'. However, there was never any doubt about the termination point of NJ9842 because it was well recognized and accepted. There was no fighting to the east or north of Pt. NJ9842 in 1971 and therefore the question of not respecting the then existing CFL (Cease Fire Line resulting from the 1949 Karachi Agreement) beyond NJ9842 or altering it in these areas beyond that point simply does not arise.
  
  Shimla Agreement also said,

  ". . . in Jammu and Kashmir, the Line of Control resulting from the ceasefire of December 17, 1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this Line."

  We now know that India only pre-empted the Pakistani aggression by a mere three or four days, as acknowledged by Pakistani Army officers themselves. Therefore, the claimed Pakistani high-moral-ground is humbug and hollow.
  
   When war ended in c. 1971, India held 5800 Sq. Kms of Pakistani territory while Pakistan held a mere 110 Sq. Kms of Indian territory on the western front. Besides, the demarcations referred to in the Karachi Agreement must hold for the same reason in this sector after the 1972 Shimla agreement also because no country, especially a country that decisively defeated the Pakistani Army which resulted in more than 50% of its territory and population seceding within a matter of a mere fortnight, and which held 93000 of Pakistani soldiers as Prisoners of War (PoWs), gives up an area (Siachen) of roughly 2000 Sq. Kms. where there was no fighting at all. Besides, the new LoC recognized only the ground realities after the war and Saltoro and Siachen were not part of these new realities. It is therefore unthinkable that an area of almost 2000 Sq. Kms would have been simply gifted away by an all-conquering army to an all-defeated army.This behaviour of the PA is quite reminiscent of its behaviour during the Shimla negotiations in 1972. It asked its President (the then Chief Martial Law Administrator, CMLA), Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to demand the following from India:
  

  Withdraw Indian troops from all occupied areas of West Pakistan & POK
  Return all the PoWs held by India without any trial for war crimes
  Demand settlement of the Kashmir issue in accordance with the wishes of Kashmiris
  Demand reduction in the size of India's armed forces to remove the Pakistani fear of aggression by India
  No exchange of territory that could give India a strategic or tactical advantage in future conflicts.

  
  Shuja Nawaz says in his book that this did not look like 'an army that had just lost a war. It sounded more like the terms of surrender offered to a defeated enemy'.
  
  Besides, there has been no question about Nubra Valley and a part of the Shyok Valley being naturally part of the Ladakh region.


• India reneged on the Siachen Agreement.
  Somehow, Pakistanis maintain that a framework for an agreement to de-militarize Siachen was agreed upon during India Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's tenure in c. 1989 but India has resiled from that later on by introducing a new condition of demanding authentication by Pakistan of actual ground position. Even as early as c. 1992, India had denied that there was any final agreement and stated that both sides had only agreed "to carry forward the process of discussions [in 1992], which had remained suspended since June 1989". In the June 1989 Siachen talks, India's position was this:

  India demanded cessation of Pakistan's cartographic aggression of unilaterally extending the LoC from NJ9842 to the Karakoram Pass
  India demanded a demilitarized zone (DMZ)
  Exchange of authenticated maps between GoI and GoP reflecting the existing ground realities.Re-deployment of IA and PA to mutually agreed positions

  
  Pakistan agreed to mutually agreed re-deployment positions of troops but they insisted the troops to be re-deployed to their 1971 ceasefire positions and wanted delimitation of the LoC beyond NJ9842 through talks and not based on ground realities.
  
  The Pakistani demands were clearly unacceptable even to an India which wanted to be flexible as a new Prime Minister, Ms. Benazir Bhuto, had just been elected democratically after a long military rule. But, clearly, no agreement could be reached as the Pakistani military never allowed civilian oversight in these matters. The joint statement at the end of the 1989 talks said,
  

  There was agreement by both sides to work towards a comprehensive settlement, based on redeployment of forces to reduce the chance of conflict, avoidance of the use of force and the determination of future positions on the ground so as to conform with the Simla Agreement and to ensure durable peace in the Siachen area

  
  The above is a vague statement running a middle line through the stands of the two governments. Pakistan is simply latching on to the third word in the above statement, namely, 'agreement' to claim as though there was an agreement.
  When Pakistan speaks of India reneging on a non-existent agreement, one is only reminded of Pakistani behavior in the light of UNSC resolution asking Pakistan to vacate J&K, its agreement in May 1948 to pay seignorage charges to India for waters through headworks in India and its immediate default, its non-settlement of partition dues to India till date, its repudiation of LoC during the Kargil conflict, its frequent violation of the 1972 Simla Agreement in various forms including sponsoring terrorism against India, its perfidious actions against the UNSC sanctioned terrorist Hafeez Saeed etc. Such is Pakistan's reputation that when it speaks of another country violating an agreement, it would not be taken seriously.
 Pakistan's "Joining two authentic points i.e. Pt NJ 9842 and KKP, duly recorded in  international agreements since 1949 and 1963" and "numerous books and atlases as far back as 1965" record them and therefore cannot be 'cartographic aggression'.

(See this)
The 1949 agreement is presumably the Karachi agreement and it beats one's credulity when somebody claims that 'thence north to the glaciers' is equivalent to 'thence south-east to Karakoram Pass". The 1963 agreement is between Pakistan and China, who partook Indian territory and therefore by no stretch of imagination, even by Pakistani standards, can it be called an international agreement authenticating Pakistani position. Such an agreement does not bind India and India does not recognize this agreement. It is a circular argument by Pakistan to refer to maps and its bilateral treaty with China in its territorial disputes with India. In fact, such references1963 China-Pakistan Boundary Agreement only buttress the Indian stand of not withdrawing from Siachen at all, When India and Pakistan themselves had not demarcated a portion of their border, how can map makers sitting in Europe and the US decide on it and how can that be binding on India ?

The Recent Kabul Attacks and Pakistan

April 15, 2012 dawned in Afghanistan as one of the most violent and bloodiest days in recent times as the Taliban launched a coordinated attack with about 40 suicide-bombers at several targets in Kabul, and locations in the three Eastern provinces of Afghanistan adjoining Pakistan, namely Nangarhar (Jalalabad), Paktia (Gardez) and Logar which are traditional strongholds of the Haqqani network. The attacks, later owned up by the Afghan Taliban as the beginning of their 'Spring Offensive', were audacious in that the targets selected in Kabul such as the embassies of the US, UK and Germany, the Afghan Parliament, the ISAF Headquarters, the Turkish military base, the office of the World Bank etc. were well guarded and were located inside the heavily guarded central district of Kabul. The tactic used was also new. The heavily-armed attackers were all suicide bombers too who wore explosive vests but instead of just blowing themselves up as they used to do before, they launched a guerrilla attack and fought for several hours. They were not for mindless suicide attacks killing themselves without causing extensive damage as it happened sometimes. They wanted to penetrate the security cordon and then blow themselves up to cause maximum or precise damage. It was thus a mixture of LeT's fidayeen attacks and the suicide bombing of the Taliban.

When the 18-hour battle eventually came to an end and resulted in 47 deaths, the Afghan Foreign Office blamed the attacks on the Pakistan-based Haqqani terror network. The Afghan interior minister Bismillah Mohammadi accused the Al-Qaeda linked and Pakistan-resident Haqqani-network, based on information given by one of the suicide bombers who was arrested (a la Ajmal Kasab in Mumbai in 2008) even as the rest of the suicide bombers had died. This has also been the refrain of the US and NATO commanders on the field in Afghanistan that the attack bore all the hallmarks of a Haqqani operation. They were surprised by the scale and sophistication of the attacks. The US Secretary of State, Ms. Clinton, agreed that “there were indications of Haqqani involvement”. She said that she had pressed Pakistan to “squeeze” the Haqqani network when she visited Islamabad in October, 2011 and would once again do so "and press it[Pakistan] hard". Describing the Haqqanis as "a group of killers, pure and simple", the long-time American ambassador in Kabul, Ryan Crocker, said, "There is no question in our mind that the Haqqanis were responsible for these attacks". He was even more explicit as to where the attacks were coming from, "We know where their leadership lives and we know where these plans are made. They're not made in Afghanistan. They're made in Miranshah, which is in North Waziristan, which is in Pakistan". A worried Government of India, whose Kabul embassy has been the target of Haqqani and LeT (Lashkar-e-Taiba) combination thrice before in c. 2008, 2009 and 2011, urgently reviewed its security procedures once again. Addressing the Army Commanders a day after the Taliban attack, India's defence minister, A.K.Antony asked them to be more vigilant. He also conducted an unprecedented second security review meeting on April 25 with his security advisers including the National Security Adviser (NSA) and the three service chiefs.

Within a week after the attack, on April 21 to be precise, the Afghan police and intelligence recovered 10 Tonnes of explosives in Kabul about to be used in terrorist activities and arrested five  terrorists including three Pakistanis belonging to Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The huge cache of explosives had been smuggled into Afghanistan from Pakistan. There is therefore a concerted and determined move to cause widespread devastation in Kabul and other Afghan provinces in the weeks and months ahead. Simultaneously, Afghanistan's National Director for Security spokesman Shafiqullah Tahiry also revealed that the Afghan security forces had also thwarted an attempt by the Haqqani network to assassinate Afghan Vice President Mohammed Karim Khalili. A week later, two Taliban terrorists attempted to assassinate the Governor of the Kandahar province, Tooryalai Wesa. Coupled with the series of assassinations in the last few months of prominent and powerful pro-democracy personalities such as Burhanuddin Rabbani, Karzai's brother and a series of police officers, these new assassinations reveal the Taliban plan which has always been to eliminate leaders. This was the tactic that the Pakistani Taliban have used very successfully against inconvenient jirga leaders in FATA and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.

To understand the Pakistani linkages to these incidents,  we need to look at a few things. One certainly is the Afghan-Pakistan relationship, at least going back to some five decades, if not earlier. We also need to look at developments within Pakistan itself in the last five years. We also should not forget to look at the continuing strategic thinking of Pakistan.

Afghan-Pakistan Relationship with Particular reference to India

The 'idea of Pakistan' (to borrow from the American expert on South Asia, Stephen Cohen) has gone through four evolutions in the last one hundred years. When a 'Mussalman Delegation' met Lord Minto, the British Viceroy in Simla in c. 1906, their demand was to ensure a separate treatment for the Muslims of British India in the political reforms that were then being set into motion. Slowly, this demand morphed into equality between the Hindus and the Muslims. Jinnah, who anointed himself as the Sole Spokesperson for all Muslims of India, put forth the fake theory that Hindus and Muslims were 'nations' and that they should be treated equally because the latter's numerical disadvantage was more than compensated by the fact that they had ruled large parts of India for six centuries before the arrival of the Colonial powers to Indian shores. However, this quest for Muslim separatism had to be supplanted, after the secession of East Pakistan (into Bangladesh) in c. 1971, with the larger Islamic identity anchored in the Middle East because the creation of Bangladesh had dealt a death blow to the hitherto prevalent dubious 'Two-Nation Theory'. By identifying itself with the larger Islamist cause after 1971, Pakistan sowed the seeds for being sucked into Islamic extremism of today. Though nobody could have predicted the twin events of 1979, namely the Soviet forces entering Afghanistan or the deposition of the Shah of Iran leading to Ayatollah Khomeini seizing power, both of which changed the face of the region, the die was cast for Pakistan with its fateful decision to identify itself with the Wahhabi ideology in the 70s. The fourth and the current stage in the evolutionary process has been the continuing and unabated migration of large sections of adherents of Islam in Pakistan to the literalist, puritanical and scripturalist Wahhabism, Deobandism and Salafism in the last two decades.

By c. 1974, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (of the Ikhwan) and Burhanuddin Rabbani had already fled Afghanistan to Pakistan to escape from Muhammad Daoud Khan who had seized power from his cousin, King Zahir Shah. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who was angered by Daoud Khan for raising the Greater Pashtunistan issue, helped Hekmatyar and his group with military training and arms and ammunition. But, their uprising fizzled out as Daoud Khan easily crushed it. However, under Daoud Khan’s onslaught against the Marxists, the latter formed a new organization, People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) which activated the leftist component in the Afghan Army, a legacy of being trained earlier by the Soviet army. The overthrow of the Daoud government by left-wing Noor Mohammed Taraki in the ‘Great Saur (April) Revolution’ of April 27, 1978 was followed by reforms of the feudal system. This was opposed by the ulemas, tribal chieftains and landowners. By March 1979, Captain Ismail Khan from Herat had started a major insurgency killing over 350 Soviet citizens. Soviet tanks from Turkmenistan retaliated killing over 5000 in Herat. Unable to bear the onslaught by the Islamists, the Afghanistan government entered into an agreement with the USSR in April 1979, the Mutual Defence Treaty. In December 1979, the Afghan Government invoked that treaty after sustained onslaught from the Panjsheri Mujahideen operating out of Pakistan. It was thus the USSR Army entered Afghanistan on Dec. 24, 1979. Foreseeing an opportunity to take revenge on the USSR, the US National Security Adviser, Zbignew Brzezinski, had already planned what he called ‘The Bear Trap’ and the CIA had clandestinely started to help the Panjsheri Mujahideen in Pakistan.

Throughout the three decades between 1950 and 1980, Pakistan and Afghanistan had tumultuous relationship leading to border clashes, closure of the borders of  a land-locked Afghanistan by Pakistan, diplomaic rows etc. Within Pakistan itself, the dominating ethnic majority of the Punjabis had to accommodate the Pashtuns in the armed forces (especially the Pakistani Army) and civil services to blunt local Pashtun nationalism. So, the developments involving Afghanistan, the USSR and the USA came as a great opportunity to Pakistan. Maj. Gen. Naseerullah Babar, the then commander of the Frontier Corps (FC) and a decade later the Interior Minister in Ms. Benazir Bhutto's government, has recalled arranging meetings between the Afghan resistance leaders and the American diplomats as early as May 1978, more than a year-and-a-half before the arrival of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The FC created the Afghan jihadi party, Hezb-e-Islami under Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The Executive Order of President Carter of July 3, 1979 authorized CIA’s covert operation and funding to anti-Marxist Afghan insurgents, to be channeled through Pakistan. Thus, the stage was set for a jihad in the Af-Pak region with far-reaching consequences that would come back to haunt the US itself twenty two years later.

The word ‘Pakistan’ that was coined to the new entity that separated from India in c. 1947 has been explained away in two different ways. One was that ‘Pak’ meant ‘pure’ while 'stan' meant 'place' and hence the ‘Land of the Pure’ (i.e. Muslims) was appropriately given the name ‘Pakistan’. The second explanation is to think of 'PAKISTAN' as an acronym based on the first letters of the provinces that were supposed to form part of the new country, namely, Punjab, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Iran, Sind, Tukharistan (Comprising of Southern Tajikistan and Northern Afghanistan), Afghania (i.e. NWFP), and Balochistan, as propounded by Rehmat Ali. By virtue of the second definition, Pakistan has a territorial claim on Afghanistan even if it does not talk about it openly.

For its part, Afghanistan was never reconciled to an arbitrary border drawn by Sir Mortimer Durand in c. 1893 that forcibly and unilaterally divided the tribes across the then British India and Afghanistan in the usual British strategy of divide-and-rule. The Durand Line was expected to provide a buffer to the British Empire (and later to Pakistan). After the massive defeat in c. 1971, Pakistan sought ways and means of countering India. The earlier tactic of aligning with the Western powers through various defence treaties had clearly failed as nobody came to its side when it most needed them against India in all the wars and skirmishes. The Afghan Jihad came as a great opportunity for a bold new concept by Pakistan against India. This was Gen. Zia-ul-Haq's idea of a 'thousand cuts to bleed India to death'. Pakistan's new approach, codenamed Operation Topaz, to bringing India to its knees needed four important ingredients before being launched. In order to deter India from reacting violently to Pakistan-sponsored jihad and terrorism and to beat her into submission, Pakistan needed nuclear weapons. Of course, there were other benefits to possessing nuclear weapons and Zia-ul-Haq's predecessor, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, had already set that process in motion. Additionally, Pakistan needed to be trained in covert warfare, intelligence etc. Pakistan also needed a lot of funds to support this jihad against a vast country such as India and arms and ammunition to fight a conventional war with India if the situation so escalated to in spite of nuclear blackmail by Pakistan. Finally, it needed jihadi and terrorist foot soldiers in large numbers who could sap India's energy from behind enemy lines or act as the first line of defence so that the regular Pakistani Army (PA) could 'plausibly deny' its involvement but victoriously march into India and avenge the ignominy of 1971 and claim territories that it had always coveted.

The developing situation in Afghanistan offered Pakistan all the opportunities to achieve these goals. Pakistan's conditions to the US for its support to Afghan Jihad were predicated upon these underlying objectives. Thus it was that the US, in pursuit of its realpolitik, turned a blind eye to growing evidence of Pakistan building nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. In fact, the US even went out of its way to protect Pakistan's clandestine acquisitions of technology and equipment. It is now well known that by c. 1983, Pakistan had acquired nuclear capability. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) provided support and training to Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID) for covert operations in Afghanistan. The skill and knowledge acquired was then transferred to the Indian theatre by the Pakistanis. The US generously supplied arms and ammunition of an offensive nature to Pakistan during the period of 1979-1989 that could be used by it also against India. Some of the platforms like the F-16s were meant to be used only against India. Under the guise of Afghan jihad, Pakistan had also established a network of terrorist tanzeems which had an unending supply of manpower from Wahhabi, Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith madrasseh established all over Pakistan through Saudi munificence. By mid-80s, Pakistan was therefore able to achieve all the pre-conditions that it felt it needed to successfully launch and conclude jihad and terror against India.

Jinnah might have demanded and got equality with India by getting a Muslim nation, but it was apparent that by no means was Pakistan equal to India in any true sense. Not only Jinnah but also other leaders of Pakistan were acutely aware of that. In order to tackle this deep and troubling asymmetry with India, Pakistan entered into 'deals' with more powerful nations. It has tried to use a lesser power like Afghanistan for the same purpose by trying to dominate it for its acquisition of 'strategic depth'. Pakistan felt betrayed by both the US and then China in the two wars of 1965 and 1971 when they stopped with mere platitudes without substantially coming to Pakistan's help otherwise. Pakistan which had been after nuclear weapons since the 60s, pursued its nuclear ambition aggressively after the cataclysmic 1971 separation of East Pakistan. Pakistan's calculations were four fold in acquiring nuclear weapons; one, was that the possession of nuclear weapons would obviate the need for looking up to the reluctant US and China for help in the event of a war with India; two, was the prestige that it would bestow upon Pakistan among the brotherly Muslim nations, something that Pakistan had always longed to but unable to achieve hitherto; third, was the freedom that it would give to Pakistan to pursue Op. Topaz under the threat of a nuclear overhang; four, was the 'parity' that the nuclear weapons afforded to Pakistan vis-a-vis India.

However, Pakistan was still afraid of its peculiar geography that did not provide enough depth from Indian borders. While this was an advantage in quickly mobilizing troops to the borders from the cantonments (India suffers in this ability because its garrisons are far removed from the borders), it poses some disadvantage in locating nuclear weapons and missile sites as they could be overrun by the Indian Air Force (IAF) or missiles or advancing Indian columns or special forces. That was when it thought of 'strategic depth'. Through the concept of ‘strategic depth’, Pakistan wanted to establish a sufficiently friendly government in Afghanistan that would more or less bury the Pakhtun nationalism that wanted to erase the artificially created Durand-line, deny any sphere of influence by India in Afghanistan, deny access to the Central Asian Republic (CAR) countries to India, and help Pakistan hide its strategic assets (or 'Crown Jewels' as it calls them) there in case of a war with India or even allow it to launch weapons of mass destruction at India from there. Pakistan thought that after the Geneva Accord in 1991, a friendly dispensation could be established in Kabul that did not include the Tajik group of Ahmed Shah Massoud who was disliked and distrusted by the Pakistani Army (PA) and the ISI. However, Pakistan had not bargained for the internecine war among the various mujahideen factions that followed the Geneva Accord. Finally, Pakistan created the Taliban who took control of Kabul and Kandahar by c. 1996. After strenuously denying for almost two decades, President Zardari finally accepted during his State visit to the U.S. in May 2009 that the Taliban was indeed the creation of Pakistan. Surprisingly, he also said that the US was also involved in that. "Taliban was part of our past and your past, and the ISI and CIA created them together" Mr. Zardari told the NBC news channel in an interview. The noted Indian strategic and security analyst, Praveen Swami, says in one of his articles, “my boys and I are riding into Mazhar-i-Sharif,” Rafiq Tarar (sic, Sultan Amin Tarar also known as Col. Imam), the head of the Pakistani intelligence's Afghan operations who was killed by his very same boys last year, was recorded saying in an intercepted 1998 conversation Thus, a 'friendly dispensation' had also been established in neighbouring Afghanistan and Pakistan turned its full focus on India now that all the pillars of Op. Topaz were finally in place.

Countries take a long time to change their policies especially a country like Pakistan which is extremely obsessed with India. For over six decades now, it has oriented the entire state, from drawing up a curriculum for school children to its foreign policy to investing so much against India, towards this obsession to defeating India. In spite of the grave devastation that has visited upon Pakistan, it has not found it fit to shake off its obsession which has brought it only gloom and doom. With a weakening PA that has hitherto managed to run Pakistan's foreign policy, the power centre is getting fragmented though the PA still retains considerable clout. However, the political dispensation that is likely to come to power next year could wreak changes. The PA may lose its clout even more significantly as leaders who identify with jihadi terrorist causes come to power and begin to subsume the PA itself. The new dispensation can be expected to implement Op. Topaz (or a more sinister variation of it) even more vigorously. They may even see a parallel between the emerging situation in c. 2013 with the situation in c. 1994 when the Taliban began to establish its ascendancy, and draw inspiration thereof. India has been consistently demanding the US and the NATO not to hold talks with the Taliban and not to leave Af-Pak without completing their task. Increasingly Russia, China, and Afghanistan's northern neighbours such as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have also been demanding the same thing. The April 15 Kabul attack reinforces these argument strongly.

Developments within Pakistan

When one discusses the developments within Pakistan, one looks at them from four different perspectives: political, economic, military and jihadi. Of course, they are all inter-related and certain developments in one of them could provide a pointer to the shape of things likely to occur in the others.

Early October, 2008 saw seven important developments in matters concerning Af-Pak and the Taliban. First, the commander of the British forces in Afghanistan said that the Afghan war was unwinnable for the NATO-ISAF forces militarily. Such a view has been expressed by the renowned ‘Colonel Imam’ - Brig. Amir Sultan Tarar (r) of the Pakistani Army with deep ties to the ISI and who helped create the Taliban - in an interview with the Sunday Times. He therefore advised the Americans to negotiate with the hard-core Taliban leadership claiming that they were the ones who mattered in the end, not the moderate or the so-called ‘good’ Taliban. It is so ironical that ultimately, he was killed brutally by the very same 'boys' even though he was rooting for them. Secondly, the word came of secret parleys in Makkah in late September, 2008, involving the Taliban and the Karzai government of Afghanistan mediated by the Saudis. Thirdly, a disturbing news emanated of Taliban influence in Lahore where CD shop owners in Hall Road were threatened who promptly burnt all CDs taking the threat seriously, women were ordered to cover their heads over loudspeakers from mosques in the Liberty Market,  and places where men and women intermixed were bombed though lightly. Fourthly, a joint session of Pakistani Parliament, briefed for several days by the Army on the Taliban threat, failed to arrive at a consensus over how to tackle the situation. There were quite a few, like the JUI-F’s Maulana Fazl-ur-Rehman, who even wanted the Taliban to present their side of the story to the Members of the National Assembly (MNAs) thereby equating the Army and the Taliban. It was again ironical that the Maulana, who created the Taliban phenomenon and remained their spiritual and political mentor, was attempted to be assassinated by the very same 'boys' soon after his defence of the Taliban in the Pakistani Parliament. The unanimous resolution that was passed in the end, on Oct. 22, 2008, pressed for a dialogue, did not appreciate the actions of the Army thus far even as it did not condemn the atrocities of the Taliban and their frequent violations of peace agreements. The resolution sought to distinguish between the ‘foreign fighters’ and ‘elements willing to abide by the constitution of Pakistan and rule of law’, an euphemism for Pakistani jihadists. This was the genesis of the ‘good Pakistani Taliban’ and ‘bad Pakistani Taliban’ concept picked up by the Obama administration in Feb. 2009 and transferred to the Afghan theatre as part of the new administration’s policy review for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Fifthly, word also leaked of the new Centcom Chief, Gen. Petraeus’ approach of ‘an awakening movement’ similar to the ‘Anbar Sunni Awakening’ that was employed among Iraqi tribals, being employed among the Pashtuns as well. Gen. Petraeus’ strategy was to control the 10% land area of Afghanistan from where he estimated 80% of attacks and terrorism originated. This needed a ‘surge’ in the strength of the NATO/ISAF armed forces and the US planned to double its strength from 38000 to over 78000 even as other important NATO countries such as Germany and France were reluctant. Sixthly, the much debated and delayed training of the Pakistani Army (especially the Frontier Corps) in guerilla warfare by the Special Forces (SF) of the US started off in Warsak region of Mohmand agency. It was reported that 32 SF soldiers of the US Army were involved. The fact that the training was in Warsak (rather than in Tarbela where it was supposed to be) and the fact that SF men were involved in it and the training also included actual field missions made one suspect that there was more to it than met the eye. The seventh, but the most important of all, development was the rapidly worsening economic situation of Pakistan with reserves falling steeply and being capable of covering hardly a few weeks’ worth of imports. Pakistan began to seek funds from friendly countries like the US, China and Saudi Arabia. All of them refused to give hard cash, the need of the hour for Pakistan. Instead, they constituted a grouping called “Friends of Pakistan” which would deliberate the issue later. In the meanwhile, in order not to default on payments and to sustain the requirement of USD 5 Billion needed in short term, Pakistan decided to approach the IMF agreeing to its harsh conditions which will lead to the Government having to take unpleasant decisions.

All these seven developments shaped the PA thinking. The PA would have euphorically concluded that they had once again defeated a superpower as they did in c. 1989 and a sense of deja vu would have revisited it. It must have also been elated by the acceptance by the US Administration of its definition of 'good' and 'bad' Taliban. Under the guise of training, the USA set up extensive intelligence gathering apparatus including human network that was successful in eliminating the most wanted terrorist, Osama bin Laden on May 2, 2011. These were the trainers whom the PA expelled first from Pakistan after the Abbottabad incident. The economic situation and the lack of interest among the traditional friends of Pakistan in resusscitating its moribund economy taught a bitter lesson to Pakistan, namely that Pakistan's economic revival (and even the survival) depends ironically upon India ! This has been the reason behind a calibrated approach by the Pakistani Government (and more importanly the PA) to open the trade doors with India.

On the political front, the significant development was Zardari's visit to India a couple of weeks back. In my opinion, the visit was intended to bolster the chances of the PPP which is otherwise staring down the barrel. Zardari can afford to give any promise to the Indian leaders, by word of mouth because he knows that either he would not be there in power to implement the promise when the time comes or he could always wriggle out as his predecessor Pakistani Presidents and Prime Ministers have done since time immemorial. On the other hand, India seems to feel that all it needs is to get a toehold and it can then force the Pakistani peace door ajar. Time will tell how foolish the Indian leadership had been. Any relaxation of conditions with respect to Pakistan will be immediately (mis)used to target India with terrorism by that country. The PA, ISI, LeT combine needs a spectacular terror attack on India sooner than later as it has been more than three years since the last strike (26 Nov 2008) and almost a year since a milder version of it struck Mumbai in c. 2011. For this unholy and evil alliance of the Pakistani official institutions and terror groups, Mumbai has become the modern-day Somnath. The relaxation of visa norms, ability to do easier financial transactions, foreign direct investment (FDI) by Pakistanis in India etc. are all avenues that can and will be easily misused. Gen. Kayani has just recently said that improved trade relationship did not mean that Pakistan would lower its conventional guard against the enemy. Coming from the Army Chief of a revisionist Pakistan that believes in the doctrine of  'offensive-defence' against India and which has been the initiator of all wars and terror against India so far, that statement could only mean that Pakistan would continue with its policy of jihad and terrorism against India. That would also mean that there is no revision to the concept of 'strategic depth' in Afghanistan. Some might argue that Kayani has also spoken of de-militarization of Siachen and 'peaceful co-existence' with India. These are to be interpreted as taqiyya. Pakistan has been demanding de-militarization of Siachen because it is no where near the Siachen glacier as it is far away on the western slopes of the Boltoro range. It is at a massively disadvantageous position and can never entertain any hope of coming anywhere near Indian positions. Further, it is unable to meet the huge costs, both men and material, of deployment there especially in the current economic situation. Its de-militarization antic is like a wolf  pitying the sheep being drenched in rain. Why has the Pakistani Army allowed the Chinese for a joint expedition to climb peaks in the forbidden zone now in a throwback to pre-1984 days that in fact prompted India to launch Operation Meghdoot to capture Siachen. Then, it was the USA that emboldened Pakistan to depict these areas as belonging to Pakistan thereby precipitating Indian action and now it is China that is trying to do the same. The Chinese may increase their presence in these areas (as they are already present in significant numbers in the rest of Balawaristan) and even defray the costs of Pakistani deployment. Gen. Kayani may be even indirectly threatening India that if they do not accede to Pakistan's terms of demilitarization of these ranges, it would allow China a free hand. In any case. the PA's words and actions are not pious and betray the old mindset once again.

The Musharraf regime (c. 1999-2007) , followed briefly by the interim caretaker government led by Senate Chairman Mohammed Mian Soomro and now the new democratic dispensation led by the PPP have all believed in two myths. One, that somehow they can isolate the Al Qaeda from the Taliban and two, the Taliban are amenable to reason and manageable unlike Al Qaeda. The underlying assumption in making these non-existent distinctions between Al Qaeda and Taliban is that the goals of the Al Qaeda and the Taliban are entirely different as the former have a worldview of Caliphate while the latter are purely Afghanistan-centric. At least that is a story that Pakistan seems to be selling its Western benefactors. Nothing can be more dangerous than these two pernicious assumptions.  However, the overlapping links among the Taliban (Afghan and Pakistani), Arab, Uzbek, Chechen, Uighur, North African, South and East Asian factions of Al Qaeda as well as the jihadi and sectarian outfits of Pakistan are so strong, based as they are on the convergence of their common Islamist goals, that making such a distinction is meaningless. The arrest in Karachi on Sep 26, 2008 of the Amir of Sindh of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and his confession reveal how the TTP and these jihadi outfits work together. It has been known that JeM fighters were helping TNSM in Swat valley and HuJI cadres were fighting along with Maulvi Fakir Muhammad’s Taliban in Bajaur. One can quote many such examples.

What is more worrying is the radicalization of the Pakistani society at large. A recent article by the noted Pakistani commentator and strategic analyst, Ms. Ayesha Siddiqa explains how Wahhabism and Deobandism are overwhelming Sufism and Barelvism in their traditional stronghold of the Punjab and the Sind, something that has become common knowledge by now.

Continuing Strategic Thinking in Pakistan

Has the PA given up on its agenda of overpowering India militarily ? At least, are there indications to that effect ? Does the PA even decide anymore on these things, as they used to do, now that the jihadi elements seem to be gaining an upper hand over it ?   Does the civilian government exercise any control over the PA and the jihadis ? And, even if they do, is Pakistan interested in behaving like any other normal nation-state in resolving disputes with a neighbour ?

These are the questions that need to be considered in the light of the incidents of April 15 in Kabul and elsewhere. Why are these questions necessary when discussing attacks on Afghanistan ? The early dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan was irredentist in nature over the question of Greater Pakhtunistan that encompassed large parts of what was then known as North Western Frontier Province (NWFP and now Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa or KP). Moreover, one of the tallest Pakhtun leaders of Pakistan, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (or Bachcha Khan or Frontier Gandhi as he was called) was a secular Congress leader who was distrusted by the Government of Pakistan (GoP) because of his Pashtun demands. To add to Pakistan's woes, Afghanistan became the only country to bitterly oppose Pakistan's entry into the United Nations (UN), of which Afghanistan was already a member. Afghanistan's opposition stemmed from its opposition to the arbitrary Durand Line which now became a de facto boundary line between Pakistan, a successor state to the British Indian Empire and itself. Pakistan's stubbornness and its attempts to convert the de facto Durand Line into a de jure concept has been opposed by all Afghan rulers up to and including the Taliban. The British bribed the khans and the maliks to suppress the Pashtun opposition to the division of their lands, a tactic that was carried forward by the Pakistanis too. After the creation of Pakistan, the UK has supported consistently the Pakistani position on the Durand Line just as it did on Pakistan's Kashmir position. Even after the expiry of the 1893 treaty in c. 1993, Pakistan has simply refused to re-negotiate. Thus, Pakistan adopts a revisionist approach with respect to India on the eastern borders and a status-quoist approach with respect to Afghanistan on its western borders. However, the Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship took a religious tone after the Soviet troops crossed the Oxus into Afghanistan a day ahead of Christmas in 1979. Pakistan found this development quite convenient to subsume Pashtun nationalism in the larger cause of Islamism. As it usually happens in such matters, the greater cause of Islamism then singed Pakistan itself in due course and the country became a burning inferno, especially after the Laal Masjid incidents of Islamabad in c. 2007. A series of incidents in the last couple of years such as the high accuracy of the CIA drones in taking out these jihadi elements and some anti-terror operation from the PA under enormous pressure have brought the situation somewhat under control in Pakistan in recent months. But, the PA has only targetted the Pakistani Taliban (the Tehrik-e-Taliban and the Punjabi Taliban who have been together clubbed as 'bad Taliban') but have not gone after the Afghan Taliban or warlords (the 'good Taliban'). When the Americans extended their drone strikes to cover the 'good Taliban' too, the Pakistanis suddenly began protesting vociferously about 'infringement to their sovereignty'. Recently, after the meetings between the United States Special Representative for Af-Pak, Marc Grossman and the top brass of the Pakistani civil and military leadership, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Ms. Hina Rabbani Khar, said, "US didn't want to listen to Pakistan's demands of halting the US drone attacks. Other means should be used to take out militants in Pakistan's northwestern tribal region near the Afghanistan border". 

A few weeks back, the Commander of the Peshawar-based XI Corps, Lieutenant-General Khalid Rabbani said what was the 'other means' that Pakistan had in mind. He said, "They may indicate (a target), we’ll pound it with the precision shooting of our F-16s. So it can be done, it has been done at one or two places. Why can’t this model be followed, we keep on telling them this is a possible model to be followed."  It beats one's credulity as to how the GPS coordinates that the US uses in its drones for bombing the hideouts of these jihadi terrorists might kill civilians while the same coordinates supplied by the Americans to the Pakistani Air Force (PAF) pilots using the American-manufactured F-16s would lead to no collateral damage !! Lt. Gen. Rabbani should also know the answer for his own question of why the Americans do not share intelligence with the Pakistanis. Such shared intelligence is always leaked to their terrorist friends immediately. We have seen this double-crossing since at least August, 1998 when the then Pakistani ISI Chief alerted Osama bin Laden of an impending US Tomahawk cruise missile attacks on Al Qaeda camps in retaliation for the coordinated Taliban bombings of the US embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya.

What does it show ? It shows that Pakistan has not given up at all on its ambition of seeing a Pakistan-compliant Taliban in power at Kabul and Kandahar post 2014. The only reason for Pakistan supporting this barbaric Taliban regime in a neighbouring country is the expectation that they would serve Pakistan's interests against its real and only mortal enemy, India. Delivering the sixth Air Chief Marshal L M Katre Memorial Lecture on April 28, an unusually blunt Indian Air Force (IAF) Chief N.A.K. Browne warned of Taliban menace for India in the coming months and years. He said, "Our fear is that we may have these forces very close to the Wagah border to deal with because the focal point of al-Qaida and Taliban has dramatically shifted very fast from Afghanistan to Af-Pak border and North West Frontier Province to the heart of Pakistan". He referred to JuD Chief Hafeez Muhammad Saeed as having said, "It is Kabul now we are dealing with. The moment we resolve that, we will take over the next phase to liberate Kashmir from Jammu & Kashmir state".

In February 2012, the Afghan President Hamid Karzai travelled to Pakistan mainly to press Pakistan to curtail cross-border Taliban attacks on Afghanistan, and to allow him direct access to the Taliban leadership located there since c. 2002. Until now, he has been singularly unsuccessful in these twin objectives. We know that during the talks, Karzai became so angry at the obstructionist behaviour of the Pakistanis that the Pakistani Prime Minister, Yousuf Raza Gilani had to abruptly call off the meeting. The April 15 Kabul attacks followed by seizure of a very large cache of explosives prove that Pakistan is completely backing the Taliban even in their violent approach towards seizing power. Even earlier, in September 2011, the Chairman of the High Peace Council, Burhanuddin Rabbani was assassinated by the Haqqanis.

This is why Pakistan has successfully pushed back enormous pressure from the US to act against the Haqqani network in North Waziristan. In c. 2006, the PA struck a peace deal with the major warlord and Haqqani supporter Hafiz Gul Bahadur of North Waziristan on February 17, 2008. This helped the Taliban forces, especially the Haqqani network, to consolidate there, as similar peace deals elsewhere had allowed similar consolidation. Hafiz Gul Bahadur formally revoked the peace deal a year later in June 2009, after the goal was achieved. To repeated US demands for action by the PA in North Waziristan, the PA had always said that it would take action at a time and place of its choice, thereby successfully evading its end of the responsibilties.

What are the likely scenarios for Pakistan after the proposed withdrawal of ISA Forces in c. 2014 ? It could lead to political stability in Afghanistan excluding the Taliban, or a devastating civil war might break out  as it happened after the Geneva Accord or the Taliban might return to power after ousting Karzai. All of them bode ill for Pakistan. Let us see how.

It has been Pakistan's contention that a politically stable democratic dispensation comprising all ethnic sections of the Afghan society would be detrimental to Pakistan's interests because a normal nation-state of Afghanistan would not only deny the undue influence that Pakistan wants to exert on it but also establish a preeminent relationship with a large economic powerhouse like India thereby furthering Pakistani paranoia of a pincer attack against Pakistan by these two nations. Besides, Pakistan wants to restrict India's access to CAR nations and it would not be served by an India- friendly dispensation at Kabul. Pakistan may also be acting as China's cat's paw in such a decision.

A devastating civil war will cause a huge exodus of Afghans into Pakistan which an insecure and increasingly impoverished Pakistan will simply be unable to sustain. Pakistan has seen fatigue among international donors in helping Pakistan as we saw during the disaster caused by floods in the Indus in c. 2009. Besides, this large influx would seriously endanger the already bad security situation within Pakistan.

If the Taliban come back to power in Afghanistan, Pakistan will not regain the strategic depth which it lost in c. 2001. The Taliban of c. 2014 would be very different from those of c. 1994 even if most of the leaders happen to be the same. They have openly aligned with the Islamist jihadi and Salafi worldview of Al Qaeda and Pakistan cannot expect to limit them just to Afghanistan. The first aim of AQAM (Al Qaeda and Allied Movements) after the Taliban establish and consolidate their power in Afghanistan would be to usurp power in Pakistan. A Taliban-sympathetic Islamist in the form of Imran Khan is most likely to be in power in Islamabad at that time. However, Pakistan either does not visualize dangers for itself or it facetiously believes that it would be able to 'manage' the Taliban as it did before. The continuing Pakistani intransigence in taking part in a constructive way in the peace discussions and the hurdles it places in giving access to the Taliban point to the continuing belief that Pakistan has in the Strategic Depth and the utility of the Afghan Taliban.

The April 15 Kabul attacks must therefore be seen in the overall context.

The Politics and the Aftermath of the Bounty on Prof. Hafiz Muhammad Saeed

Never a dull moment for Pakistan watchers. This week has already seen two significant developments, first the announcement of the visit of President Asif Ali Zardari to India quickly followed by an unexpected US bounty, a huge one at that of USD 10 Million, on Professor Hafiz Muhammad Saeed saheb, the Chief of Jama't-ud-Dawah (JuD) and the Lashkar-e-Tayba (LeT). I will interchangeably refer to LeT and JuD in this post because they are one and the same even though Pakistan attempts to find non-existent differences between these two. The UNSC (which includes Pakistan's all-weather friend China) does not share the Pakistani obfuscation and therefore we too will not distinguish between these two terrorist tanzeems. Another bounty of USD 3 Million has been announced for the capture of Professor saheb's right-hand man, top jihadi ideologue of LeT, and Professor saheb's brother-in-law Abdul Rehman Makki. One wonders why Lashkar's Head for Transnational Terror Operations, Sajid Mir was not similarly slapped with a bounty. It was Mir who was calmly directing the terrorists, motivating them and diabolically plotting the cold-blooded carnage in Mumbai on 26/11. Then, there are the officers of the Pakistani Army (PA) and the Navy (PN) who were accomplices in terror who need to be sorted out as well.

On the face of it, these bounties appear to show the US committment to fighting terror. The US has been accused by India of not being impartial in its determination to fight terror as it benignly neglected the overpowering and compelling evidence of terrorism practised by the PA and its various proxies, most notably the LeT. Of course, the US is under no obligation to help India as it pursues its own interests. But, many US decisions in the past have hurt India and helped the non-state actors of Pakistan. To that extent, the US owes a debt to India in cleansing the region of its jihadi creation. Well, Brzezinski famously said, "What is most important to the history of the world? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some stirred-up Moslems or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the cold war?". Some stirred up Moslems, they have turned out to be.

Coming to the present, the US must have made a careful study before announcing these twin bounties. It proposes to achieve several benefits for itself by this announcement. For those Indians doubtful of the US committment, of which there are plenty, the US hopes to send a message that their doubts were misplaced. For a Pakistan which is still grappling with how to re-define its relationship with the US in the context of the massive hatred for the US among the Pakistani masses while continuing to get generous funds and arms from it, the US is sending a stern message too. The message is stark for Pakistan that the US can cause troubles if it so wishes. The UNSC Resolution 1822 has already implicated Professor saheb and the JuD and has put that organization on par with LeT (which has already come under the UNSC resolution). On Dec. 10, 2008, the venerable Professor saheb was notified as a terrorist by the AL-QAIDA AND TALIBAN SANCTIONS COMMITTEE of the UNSC. The UNSC Resolution 1822 (2008) details what steps a Government has to follow in such a case, none of which Pakistan has cared to do. And, the UNSC has kept quiet too. With the anti-America hatred at an all-time high in Pakistan, any submission to US pressure and that too involving a mard-e-momin like Professor saheb would lead to civil war and bloodbath in Pakistan. This bounty is dead even before being born.

The Indian Foreign Minister, S.M.Krishna has welcomed the bounty and felt that the latest US action vindicated the Indian stand that JuD was a terrorist organization and that Professor saheb was the master planner of the 26/11 crime. How comical is this welcome considering that it was not India which announced this bounty but another nation which comparatively lost much less in the carnage on 26/11 ! The Indian Home Minister P Chidambaram hoped that it would “prod the Pakistan government to take action.” He, however, quickly expressed pessimism about the prospect, saying “Pakistan was in denial and continues to be in denial.” He should know. Let us jog our memory and go three years back to June 2009. That month was significant for Pakistan because it successfully turned around India, for the umpteenth time in sixty two years of its unremitting confrontation. On June 16, 2009, Man Mohan Singh met Zardari on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting at Yekaterinburg in Russia. That was barely seven months after the horrendous 26/11 urban warfare unleashed on India by the Pakistani Army (PA) and its proxy, the LeT. Gen. Kayani, Lt. Gen. Shuja Ahmed Pasha, and a number of PA and ISI officers had planned the details of the 26/11 urban guerilla warfare minutely. But, the Indian PM Man Mohan Singh had decided to overlook the terrible act within seven months and had embarked on the reconciliation strategy. Yet, he played a little drama at Yekaterinburg for Indian mass consumption, by telling Zardari within earshot of the assembled TV crew, "Excellency, I am pleased to meet you. But I have a limited mandate to tell you that the Pakistani territory can't be used for acts of terror against India". Why should we consider this blunt (I, for one do not even consider this as blunt considering the magnitude of 26/11 and the scores of terror acts before, especially the promise made by Gen. Musharraf on Jan 12, 2002 after the December 2001 Indian Parliament attack) talking as hot gas is because it was this meeting that set the agenda for what followed immediately thereafter and continues to this day. After that blunt message in front of journalists, Man Mohan Singh and Zardari had a one-on-one meeting for 45 minutes that sealed India's fate yet again. Asif Ali Zardari, like all Pakistani Presidents, Generals and Prime Ministers before him, promised (a more appropriate description would be, 'lied') to take action against the terrorists and bring the 26/11 culprits to book. Man Mohan Singh believed his words and ordered restoration of 'peace dialogue'. The US was quick to welcome the meeting between Zardari and Man Mohan Singh, as were sections of Indian intelligentsia. That meeting set the stage for the even more shameful Sharm-el-Sheikh meeting in July, 2009 where Man Mohan Singh directed his Foreign Secretary to voluntarily implicate India in the internal affairs of Pakistan and get equated to a terrorism-sponsoring Pakistan in the process. Indian foreign policy was once again being shaped directly and solely by a Prime Minister who was not quite adept in the art. The choice of a docile and laid-back S.M. Krishna as the Foreign Minister in his cabinet appears in hindsight to be a deliberate decision by Man Mohan Singh to carry out his imbecilic Pakistan agenda. Mr. Man Mohan Singh’s approach to Pakistan can only be equated with a similar disastrous approach by another Indian Prime Minister, I.K. Gujral. Just as we have not yet recovered from the Gujral effect, We will take decades to recover from the Man Mohan Doctrine as well.

So, what will Pakistan do now ? Predictable. There are different parties there who will react differently, but all of them would work towards the common goal of protecting the venerable Professor saheb because jihad against the Indians and the Great Satan, the USA, needs people like him. This post in this blog explains as to why Lashkar-e-Tayba is so important for the PA in particular and the Pakistani State in general. . The Government of Pakistan (GoP) would say that neither India nor the USA has given any solid proof that could stand in a court of law to convict professor saheb. The Pakistani Prime Minister Gilani has already said so. The Foreign Office spokesperson has gone one step ahead and said that this bounty vindicates the Pakistani position that so far India has not given worthwhile evidence. I expect the Interior Minister Rehman Malik to also brazenly say on the Indian soil tomorrow, that the judiciary of Pakistan which was well known throughout the world for its fierce independence (he would even cite the examples of its on-going actions against the President, the Prime Minister and even the PA) has already released Professor saheb after a lengthy and due process of trial in the Lahore High Court and then in the Supreme Court and that there is not much that GoP can do now against him unless India shares fresh evidence. He would also say that the evidence given so far by India had been mere conjectures and not solid proof, that have been thrown out by the Lahore High Court as well as the Supreme Court and if India could furnish more evidence, he would be only too willing to prosecute Professor saheb. He would demand that the judiciary of Pakistan must be respected. He would conclude by saying that to the best of his government's knowledge, JuD was merely a charity organization involved in Daw'ah, social work like running educational institutions and hospitals for the poor and was not involved in acts of terrorism.

Nothing more should be expected from GoP, if one looks back at how it has been handling the issue of LeT, JuD and more so Professor saheb. In the second week of December, 2008, Pakistan fooled the world by enacting a farcical drama of cracking down on JuD after the UNSC resolution had included JuD and Professor saheb in its sanctions list. The Muridke headquarters was not even touched and the ostensible explanation given by both the Punjab and the federal GoP was that were JuD’s charity work to be affected, it would adversely impact millions of poor Pakistanis across the country and that these were unrelated to terrorism anyhow. In fact, the Punjab government, which under Nawaz Sharif’s brother, Shahbaaz Sharif, has always showed open alliance with various terrorist organizations, went ahead and allocated USD 1 million to JuD out of its budget for c. 2009. Later, JuD spokesman himself reacted with astonishment over this allocation. On January 6, 2009, the JuD spokesman threatened the government as follows: “Hafiz Saeed has followers all over Pakistan and it is not possible for the government of Pakistan to even think about handing him over to India,”

Professor saheb, for his part, has already said that US had no means of knowing anything about him and its action is based on unreliable second-hand information from enemy India which has a vested interest in prosecuting him. He would also blast the unholy alliance between Hindu India and Christian USA, both kafir, that now stood exposed. He would challenge and tease the Americans to catch him if they could a la Muhammad Ali. He would not hide in a deep underground bunker or become incommunicado. He is not like a Ramzi Yousef, the nephew of Khaled Sheikh Muhammed (KSM), who was a fugitive after having been involved in the 1993 WTC bombing , the Bojinka Plot to bomb mid-air American planes over the Atlantic etc. and for whom a USD 2 Million was announced under the US Rewards for Justice (RFJ) programme. The bounty led to his tip-off. Same was the case with another Pakistani, Mir Aimal Kansi, who killed CIA employees at Langley, Virginia and escaped to Dera Ghazi Khan in FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Agencies) in AfPak region. A USD 2 Million dollar bounty did him in eventually a few years later. On the contrary, Professor saheb would use every opportunity now to interact more with the public and the journalists, spewing out more venom against the Hanud-Yahud-Nasara (Hindus-Jews-Christians) conspiracy against the Muslims. He knows pretty well that his own LeT which is a large and armed-to-the-teeth terrorist organization, as well as the other dozens of Sunni terrorist organizations in Pakistan and even those who may not see eye-to-eye with him like some factions of the Punjabi Taliban, his patron the PA, dozens of Islamist organizations, political leaders from all parties who are hand-in-glove with him, the judiciary, and more importantly the masses of Pakistan would stand solidly behind him. Nobody, would therefore be able to catch him and hand him over to the Americans, a ridiculous proposition to start with anyway.

The Pakistani political parties which are debating the recommendations of the Pakistan Committee for National Security (PCNS) would find it even more difficult to take a pragmatic and practical view anymore and perforce have to harden their stand, lest they be accused of being American agents. There was some evidence of cracks among the political leaders on the tough stand against the US and that would evaporate now. The Zardari government would try to shake off the American pressure to open the NATO supply routes, to be more cooperative in the talks with the Taliban, to allow the drone operations etc. by citing the unanimous decision of the Parliament. Anything else could see the immediate demise of the PPP government, a blow from which they might just not be able to recover because the unthinkable act of handing over a true momin Professor saheb to kafir America would be simply blasphemous and the munafiqin (hypocrites untruthful to Islam) Zardari, Gilani, Rehman Malik& Co will be branded murtad (apostate) and deservingly stoned to death.

The US knows that this bounty announcement would not pressurize Pakistan into taking any action against terrorism, much less against a national jihad hero like Professor sahib. India knows that too. So, why did the US announce this bounty and why has India welcomed it ? The reasons are starkly different for the two.

There are three reasons why the US has done what it has done now. One, it fears that the incorrigible extremist elements in Pakistan could derail the Afghan peace dialogue and therefore a successful conclusion to US/NATO presence by c. 2014. Secondly, it needs India's support in various issues and therefore has a need to appear, in Indian eyes, of being tough with Pakistan. Thirdly, the USA may have a genuine fear of Pakistan sliding into another roguish North Korea.

There are several conflicting situations that one has to face when one begins to wield more and more power in career or in life. This is the same for nations as well. The sole super power runs into similar predicaments regularly every other day in different corners of the world, especially as it practises realpolitik furiously. The situation was vastly different when the comity of nations was generally divided into black and white between the West and the Soviets with a tiny shade of gray in the form of inconsequential non-aligned countries. The situation has been fraught with more danger for the US since the demise of the Soviet Union. The US finds itself in the same tight-corner, fine-balance situation with respect to AfPak and the Indian subcontinent. The US needs Indian support in various issues such as those involving Iran, China, South East Asia, Asia-Pacific, global economy, etc. It has to constantly bait India but it also knows that India can be baited easily because it is normally quickly satisfied with symbolic gestures from the US by attributing deep friendly motives of a strategic nature for the far away future. The need for Pakistan in the short and medium terms is enormous for the US. The US is very reluctant to use its leverage against Pakistan. The widening trust deficit since c. 1962 between these two countries is almost at rock bottom today. The US has nothing to lose in Pakistan. Its image among the frothing-at-the-mouth-corner Pakistani Abduls (which is practically the entire country) is simply not going to improve even if it gifts each Pakistani a million dollars. The only way it can redeem itself is if it sides diplomatically and militarily with a Pakistan that attacks India and humiliates it. Anything short of this, would simply not work. This is something that the US will not be able to do for various reasons.

At the same time, the USA also needs a lot of Pakistani assistance in concluding its campaign in Afghanistan and effecting an orderly and less bloody withdrawal with its pride somewhat in tact. The US may also not want a nuclear Pakistan to become another North Korea and destabilize the region and world order even more than what it already is. Pakistan is increasingly coming under the Dragon's influence just like North Korea. {See 'A Perspective of the American and the Chinese Presence in Pakistan'}These compelling reasons to balance India against Pakistan and vice-versa drives the US to take different decisions at different times. The de-hyphenation between India and Pakistan in US calculations that President George Bush Jr spoke about does not go so deep after all. The bounty on Professor saheb has seemingly earned the gratitude of a senile and impotent Indian leadership that is satisfied with mere symbolism without substance while the US might have assured the Pakistanis, behind the Indian backs, that the threat against Professor saheb would never materialize and remain only on paper. While Ms. Wendy Sherman came to India and announced the US decision on Professor saheb, Washington simultaneously dispatched Tome Nides, Deputy Secretary of State to Islamabad as a balancing act. Pakistan's Interior Minister, Rehman Malik claimed that the US has not conveyed to it any information about the bounty. That might have been said to preserve the honour & dignity (H&D), but one heard no counter from the US administration. Pakistan escapes every time by pretending not to have received any tough message from its friends or adversaries and the friends and adversaries do not shame Pakistan by countering such false claims by GoP hoping that by not publicly shaming Pakistan, it would mend its ways. Nothing of that sort has ever happened. It is time that such falsehood by GoP is not allowed to go unchallenged. Even if it may not change Pakistan's behaviour, this tactic will at least be different from the policy of appeasement that has been tried for decades now and found to be an utter failure.

The reason why India has welcomed the US move is very different. India has no other option. We have eschewed any option other than showing our other cheek to persistent and increasingly hard slaps from Pakistan. Our Government is labouring under false assumptions. It thinks that improving Indian economy is the prime target (which is a sensible thing that any normal nation-state tries to achieve) and buying peace with Pakistan is important for that. The false beliefs here are that the ever widening gap will eventually make Pakistan see the futility of it all and drop its 'enduring hostility' with us or that the economic strength will translate into a military, political and diplomatic clout at some time in the future that we can then use to put a stop permanently to Pakistani transgressions if Pakistan was still about and around two decades hence. Both are inherently flawed, but now is not the time to discuss that. Therefore, India has abdicated the responsibility of being a 'bad cop' to the USA and wants to be recognized by Pakistan as a 'good cop'. India and the US might have come to some understanding on this or simply India is riding piggyback on the US predicament with Pakistan here. At the same time, the Indian leadership has to be seen as pursuing the Mumbai 26/11 case (and other such issues) vigorously and hence this welcome to the US offer of bounty.

So, overall, the US and India are pursuing different routes with only a partial overlap of the goals vis-à-vis Pakistan. In the 1980s, the US Administration made noises but discreetly allowed Pakistan to acquire nuclear weapons and their delivery platforms clandestinely. Since c. 2002, it has generously supplied the Pakistanis with offensive weapons and platforms that would be useless in counter-terrorism operations and would be useful only against India. It allowed an evil David Coleman Headley escape Indian investigators and legal process. Who knows, even the RFJ bounty against Professor sahib may be to stake a US first claim on him in case he is somehow caught in the unlikeliest case, thus preventing him from falling into the hands of Indian investigators and legal system. I realize that it is a very cynical view but one never knows what the USA is up to and we need to be cautious. That is their reputation.

For an Indian administration that is clueless, docile and even senile, there is no worthwhile option left than to welcome such useless US announcements.

The Significance of the Zardari Visit

Mr. Asif Ali Zardari, President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, has suddenly decided to visit the Sufi shrine of Hazrat Khwaja Muinuddin Chishti at Ajmer Sharif in India, a place of important pilgrimage for Berelvi and Sufi Muslims of the subcontinent. He has also accepted an offer to lunch with the Indian Prime Minister, Man Mohan Singh, on April 8. Though it is being claimed by the advisor of Mr. Zardari, Farhatullah Babar, that the visit had been in the offing for the past one year and had not materialized suddenly, this excuse is not entirely convincing. Let me state why.

It is a common practice amongst the religiously inclined, to promise to visit a particular shrine if Divine intervention helps them in being cured of an illness, or delivered from a particularly difficult situation etc. This is especially so in the Indian subcontinent and from that angle, Zardari has every reason to visit Ajmer Sharif. He seems to have recovered from a purported stroke that led to a mild facial paralysis in December 2011, for treating which he was flown to Dubai and where he remained for two weeks before returning to Pakistan. But, not many, except the hardcore jiyalas of the Peoples Party of Pakistan (PPP), were convinced that the President had indeed suffered a stroke and had gone to Dubai to recover and recuperate under more able medical hands there than were available in Islamabad. I don't blame the nay-sayers because Pakistan's history of deceit, deception, double-crossing and lying is such that nobody believes anything being said in Pakistan, least of all by the politicians. To be fair to the Pakistanis, they do not only practice these fine arts particularly well against the Indians and the Americans (and to varying degrees against the rest of the world including the sweeter-than-the-sweetest-honey friend China) but also against each other amongst themselves. Instances are aplenty and I will reserve them for another post. At that time when Zardari fled to Dubai, he was under immense pressure from the Pakistani Army (PA) with the recently exploded 'Memogate' scandal consuming all of Pakistan. One has to remember that there is absolutely no love lost between the Bhutto clan and the PA. Unfortunately for the PA, the long-standing Master, the United States of America, facilitated the return of Ms. Benazir Bhutto from her partly self-imposed and partly Musharraf-imposed exile, and her participation in the elections. Her return came as a big blow to the ambitions of the ruling coterie, Gen. Musharraf and the PML-Q Chief Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain. They rightly feared their continuing retention of power. With the huge support for her everywhere she went, with the dislike for Gen. Musharraf's rule, with the pre-poll alliance between the two largest parties of PPP and PML-N, with the dire economic situation, and with the country-wide lawyers' agitation against Gen. Musharraf's high-handedness in dismissing the Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP) and declaring an Emergency, Ms. Bhutto's victory was a foregone conclusion. The only way out for Gen. Musharraf and the King's party that was supporting him, was to physically eliminate Ms. Benazir Bhutto, after having successfully tackled Nawaz Sharif by re-exiling him in an unexpected minor side-drama. They proceeded to implement their diabolical plot. However, they did not expect the turn of events that followed the assassination of Ms. Bhutto, leading to the PPP seizing power due to overwhelming public sympathy and through deft manoeuvres along with PML-N. To add insult to injury, Gen. Musharraf had to vacate the Presidency in favour of PA's most despised man (and to be fair to the PA, by a large section of the people of Pakistan too), Asif Ali Zardari. Indeed, fatefully, Gen. Musharraf had to himself leave the country in an un-announced exile. Since that time, the PA has tried many tricks to oust Zardari. Nothing succeeded though Zardari came close to being sent packing a couple of times. Credit partly goes to Zardari for managing the situation successfully so far and partly to other circumstances.

However, the situation was very critical when Zardari decided to fly to Dubai on a dubious medical emergency. There was pressure on him from the PA to resign or face the very real possibility of an army coup if he resisted. Mr. Zardari knew that no world power or leader would come to his help if he ended up in prison, other than issuing some inane statements. His father-in-law. Zulfikar Ali Butto, was executed with impunity by Gen. Zia-ul-Haq. Except for customary noises, nobody intervened. His wife was brutally murdered and the murderer freely lives and lectures in Western countries. Though he endured solitary confinement and physical abuses during his previous incarceration, Zardari was much older now and was unwilling to undergo once again that cruelty. So, he escaped to Dubai with the triple intention of cooling down the unbearably rising political temperature, escaping the possible coup and the consequent stint in the Attock prison overlooking the Indus near Peshawar, and planning with his friends his next moves. The PA had played a neat game, using the widespread public hatred against the USA after especially the Salala incident, to its advantage by depicting Zardari as an ally of the US conspiring against the nationalist and Islamist PA. The matter was deadly serious because Zardari would get no sympathy even from the jiyalas. The judiciary of the Pakistani Supreme Court which also has a score to settle with Zardari interposed itself in the matter leading to further troubles for him. The troubles are continuing what with his confidante and incumbent Prime Minister Gilani about to be sentenced for contempt of court and removed from power. Zardari's political troubles are about to snowball in the coming weeks. Like Pakistan since its inception, Zardari is also moving from one trouble to a bigger next trouble.

For its part, the PA certainly wants to get rid of Zardari and his PPP as quickly as possible. The PA, apart from its hatred for the Bhuttos and their political party for historical reasons, are also feeling threatened by Zardari and Gilani's words and actions against its interests since coming to power in c. 2008. Since then, the Zardari and Gilani combine has astonishingly tried to tame the PA and the notorious Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). First, they decided to bring the ISI under civilian control which indeed misfired within a few hours and the orders had to be withdrawn hurriedly. But, the effort was well worth recognizing since nobody before had attempted this. Then, Zardari bravely attempted to redefine the nuclear doctrine to 'No First Use' (NFU) all by himself, which again fell through. Again, the attempt needs recognition. The Pakistani Supreme Commander described India as not the threat facing the country, puncturing the PA's raison d'etre. After 26/11, Gilani agreed to send the ISI Chief to India, which he had to retract immediately under PA/ISI pressure. Normally, I would have called it a coordinated drama between the civilians and the khakhis, but this appeared genuine to me. Then, the political setup agreed to the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill, which imposed restrictions on the PA and directly named the LeT, but the bill had to be eventually diluted as the PA put its foot down and the Americans dithered and surrendered to the Pakistani khakhis. Even the extension of the terms of COAS Gen. Kayani and DG, ISI Lt. Gen. Pasha in c. 2010, was not automatic and they were kept on tenterhooks for quite a while before the announcements were made. This was so even when the US had indicated its desire for the continuation of these two. When the episode of the CIA Agent Raymond Davis erupted, Gilani eased out the PA's most trenchant supporter in the cabinet Makhdoom Shah Mehmood Qureshi. Gilani's recent taking on of Kayani, through the interview to Xinhua, or in the National Assembly, and his sarcastic remarks about the type of visa given to OBL for staying in Abbottabad, were unprecedented. He then sacked the Lt. Gen. who was the choice of Gen. Kayani for Defence Secretary's post and for the first time, since the 70s, appointed a civilian as the Defence Secretary. The Defence Secretary had earlier stated in an affidavit in the Supreme Court in connection with the Memogate that the PA and the ISI were not under the operational control of the Ministry of Defence(MoD). An angry Gilani used the opportunity to get rid of a PA-appointee by blaming him for causing a rift between the govt and the PA, a nice excuse which put the PA on the mat. He added insult to PA's injury by replacing the mard-e-momin Lt. Gen. with a woman. Gen. Kayani immediately changed the Commander of the 111 Brigade, a brigade which is always used to stage the military coup in Islamabad. But, the threat, if it was one, did not cause a ripple. I have not seen such concerted efforts to tame the PA and the ISI anytime before, except when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto toyed with his Service Chiefs after becoming the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) in the wake of the massive 1971 defeat. The 'Memogate' issue has been fizzling out. The ISI Chief, Lt. Gen. Shuja Pasha who orchestrated many a campaign against Zardari including the latest Memogate, has been shown the exit without being offered an extension. It is no wonder therefore that the PA and the ISI are gunning for the head of Zardari, figuratively, I hope. They are propping up Imran Khan and the powerful Lashkar-e-Tayba (LeT) as well as sundry other Islamist and jihadi outfits under the banner of Diffa-e-Pakistan Council (DPC) to fight both Zardari and Nawaz Sharif in the imminent elections. While Zardari might have weathered the storm so far, the future is increasingly bleak for him and his party politically.

Be that as it may, Zardari is hemmed in from other directions as well. The economy is doing pretty badly. Of course, it was never shining in the last 65 years on its own steam, though die-hard Pakistanis want everyone to believe that in the 60s, Pakistan was a Tiger economy and the rest of Asia was simply dying to copy its economic miracle. The various Human Development indices place Pakistan in the category of a Least Developed Country (LDC). Increasingly, Pakistan is being mentioned in the same breath as Sudan, Somalia and similar nations. Pakistan has attracted not more than USD 400 million as investment this current year. The Friends of Democratic Pakistan (FoDP) are hesitatnt to help. The electric power situation is so horrible even before the summer has set in. The non-availability of natural gas, as well as electricity, has hit hard the only worthwhile industry of Pakistan, the textile industry, which alone brings in 70% of the foreign exchange earnings. The quantitative easing by the European Union, through GSP+, cannot therefore be taken advantage of by Pakistan. Non-availability of petroleum products and their steep price are affecting the Pakistani transportation system, especially the Railways which is already reeling under the non-functioning of the defective Chinese railway engines. The world economic situation is itself such that Pakistan should not expect its usual succour from others anytime soon. Even the Chinese are unable to help Pakistani economy much. In December, 2011, the leading Chinese bank, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China had withdrawn from plans to head a consortium meant to finance the $1.6-billion Pakistani portion of the IPI (Iran-Pakistan-India) gas pipeline. A couple of months earlier, a Chinese coal-mining company had abruptly cancelled a huge contract to develop the Tharparkar coal seams in the Sind citing worsening security situation especially for the Chinese workers. As they say, another door opens whenever one is shut. The Chinese company's pull-out must leave the field wide open for the erstwhile nuclear and missile scientist and the new coal expert, Dr. Samar Mubarakmund, to speedily implement his coal gassification plant there. Thus, Pakistan's smart idea of playing China against the US has come a cropper. Realizing this, Pakistan has started making concilliatory moves vis-a-vis the USA. This time, even the acclaimed Pakistani tactical brilliance failed miserably. The usual floods are around the corner too. Pakistan is stretched on all fronts. Overall, therefore, the situation is very bleak for Pakistan.

Therefore, Zardari has perforce to seek aid from wherever he can get. Even 'mortal kafir enemy' India, for that matter. The Indian Prime Minister, who is willing to even travel the whole distance to meet his Pakistani counterpart at the slightest hint, sees a great opportunity for bringing peace to the troubled India-Pakistan relationship. He is now resigned to his analysis that Pakistan will never change and the only option left for him is to help them see Indian generosity hoping that somehow their mindset will change a wee bit after that. The Indian side might have also been alarmed by the possibility of Imran Khan and his jihadi, PA and Islamist supporters coming to power in c. 2013, not far away from the D-Day in Afghanistan by mid-2014. Indian assessment might be that Zardari (or Nawaz Sharif) might be a better prospect for India than a rampaging Imran Khan and his friends. India badly needs energy security and the TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) pipeline would be important now that the much hyped KG-D6 gas fields have serious issues. Mr. Singh has therefore decided to export 5000 MW of electricity and export a slew of petroleum products and even natural gas through trucks immediately and later through a pipeline. He has decided to relax visa rules, encourage cross-border financial and banking services etc. Zardari wants even more from India if his fortunes are to be turned around. He wants to balance the public hatred for the US that is hurting him with the concessions from India. We know that furious Track-II discussions have been going on for about two years now. The restoration of the Composite Dialogue last year was an indicator of the thaw in the relationship. India is beginning to accept the usual stonewalling tactic of Pakistan in the 26/11 case because it probably feels that such an approach would help in the overall scheme of things. It is my inkling that some big ticket announcement is around the corner. Naturally, that announcement must be of such a nature that the Pakistani masses see concesions being prised out from India. The MFN carrot, being dangled infront of India, and its timeline of end-2012 coincides nicely with various developments. If India reneges on its promise, MFN might not materialize. India, in its eagerness and under pressure from the US, may be quite willing to concede as much as possible. However, it may be demanding some unwritten assurances in return, which of course, Pakistan can be expected to flout at the first instance as it happened after the Simla accord of c. 1972 when Pakistan refuted the secret promises that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had given to Mrs. Indira Gandhi. He had pleaded for not including these in the written document so as to save the honour and dignity (H&D) of Pakistan. It is significant that the Indian Prime Minister, while referring to an invitation from his Pakistani counterpart to visit Islamabad, said, "something solid needs to be done before we can celebrate". Note the reference to the 'joint celebrations'; Mr. Man Mohan Singh did not say that "something solid needs to be done before I can visit Pakistan". The Pakistani side is now trying to tie up all the loose ends at the highest level, perhaps. The Pakistani side is now trying to tie up the loose ends at the highest level, perhaps.

The only way Pakistani economy can improve is if it turns to India. The only way Pakistan can defeat terrorism (if it really wants to) is when it turns to India. The only way that Zardari feels that he can retain power is with help from India. Thus, everything in Pakistan revolves around India. Unfortunately for Pakistan, India is like a quicksand for them. The more they try to extricate themselves from Indian influence, the deeper they are dragged into it. Therefore, Zardari is coming to India to seek help and understanding from a generous Mr. Man Mohan Singh. What a turn of events.


PS: Thank God, there was no one-on-one meeting at Seoul between Man Mohan Singh and Gilani. It could be different in New Delhi when Zardari meets Man Mohan Singh. Of course, language is not an issue between the two but I understand that Zardari can also speak fluent Punjabi. It is the one-on-one meeting that Indians must fear and Pakistanis must rejoice.